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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the privately-own IRIDIUM satellite con-
stellation, to provide a location service that is independent of the
GNSS. In particular, we apply our findings to propose a new GNSS
spoofing detection solution, exploiting unencrypted IRIDIUM Ring
Alert (IRA) messages that are broadcast by IRIDIUM satellites.
To achieve the above-introduced objective, we firstly reverse-
engineer many parameters of the IRIDIUM satellite constellation,
such as the satellites speed, packet interarrival times, maximum
satellite coverage, satellite pass duration, and the satellite beam
constellation, to name a few. Later, we adopt the aforementioned
statistics to create a detailed model of the satellite network. Subse-
quently, we propose a solution to detect unintended deviations of a
target user from his path, due to GNSS spoofing attacks. We show
that our solution can be used efficiently and effectively to verify the
position estimated from standard GNSS satellite constellation, and
we provide constraints and parameters to fit several application
scenarios. All the results reported in this paper, while showing the
quality and viability of our proposal, are supported by real data. In
particular, we have collected and analyzed hundreds of thousands
of IRAmessages, thanks to a measurement campaign lasting several
days. All the collected data (1000+ hours) have been made available
to the research community.
Our solution is particularly suitable for unattended scenarios
such as deserts, rural areas, or open seas, where standard spoofing
detection techniques resorting to crowd-sourcing cannot be used
due to deployment limitations. Moreover, contrary to competing
solutions, our approach does not resort to physical-layer infor-
mation, dedicated hardware, or multiple receiving stations, while
exploiting only a single receiving antenna and publicly-available
IRIDIUM transmissions. Finally, novel research directions are also
highlighted.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) technologies today are
used massively in several application scenarios, spanning from
turn-by-turn terrestrial navigation, airborne and maritime naviga-
tion, timing purposes in smart grid, to name a few [28]. Despite
Global Positioning System (GPS) by the US is the most famous,
in the last years several region-specific solutions with the same
aim have appeared, such as the European GALILEO, the Russian
GLONASS, and the Chinese BEIDOU, to name a few. The vast ma-
jority of the functionalities provided by GNSS systems are open
and available to the public, e.g., GPS provides an unencrypted (and
un-authenticated) signal. While the lack of encryption fueled their
adoption worldwide, in many use-case scenarios, unfortunately,
the lack of authentication makes these systems prone to cybersecu-
rity attacks. Indeed, the adversary can easily generate fake GNSS
signals, and broadcast them to a set of targets, biasing the compu-
tation of their actual positions. We refer to the previous behavior
as spoofing [22].
While requiring minimum background knowledge, cheap hard-
ware, and free-to-use software, location spoofing is easy to play,
but hard to detect and mitigate. Indeed, since GNSS satellites are
orbiting in a Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), far away from the ground
(about 20,000 Km), GNSS signals reach the ground with a very weak
signal-to-noise ratio. Therefore, an adversary can easily overcome
the aforementioned received signal strength, being always much
closer to the target device than the satellite constellation. Even-
tually, the (spoofed) signals transmitted by the adversary reach
the target device and—having a higher SNR—are considered as the
actual ones, and adopted for the final computation of the device’s
location [27]. The low strength of the GNSS received signal makes
GNSS technologies also vulnerable to jamming, being it intentional
(attack) or unintentional. While there is an active research commu-
nity on localization of malicious jamming sources and mitigation
of their effect, the unintentional jamming, due to radar, radios, and
electromagnetic interference (e.g. from pumps and engines), is more
difficult to mitigate, and can cause significant issues to the correct
reception of GNSS satellite signals, by breaking the link for even
long period of time [15].
During the years, several techniques have been adopted to detect
and mitigate GNSS spoofing attacks [22]. Some of them analyze
the physical layer, trying to distinguish if the signals are coming
from one only source (that could be a potential spoofer) or a set of
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sources, such as a genuine satellite constellation [12]. Other solu-
tions resort to crowd-sourcing, i.e., combining context information
from neighbors, ad-hoc infrastructure, and cellular network infor-
mation. However, the current state of the art does not take into
account the specific scenario where signal sources are, by design,
solo sources, or when just a few additional sources can be leveraged,
but for a limited, intermittent, not predictable, period of time. In
such scenarios, the deployment of additional infrastructures might
be impractical, and the usage of physical layer information might
not be possible due to either the lack of the underlying physical phe-
nomenon, or because of the high price of ad-hoc hardware needed
to exploit it.
A striking example is represented by open seas navigation, where
ships resort only to GNSS positioning for computing their current
location and heading up to the destination. Indeed, open seas navi-
gation is witnessing an emergent trend, and similarly to the auto-
motive industry, ships are becoming more and more autonomous.
According to recent forecasts, a landscape of fully autonomous
vessels is predicted by the year 2035, where GNSS technology will
be massively adopted to provide location awareness [24]. In such a
scenario, GNSS jamming and spoofing will become dreadful threats,
since autonomous vessels—even more than the human-controlled
ones—require a trusted and precise localization procedure [2].
Contribution. In this paper, we provide twomain contributions.
First, we reverse-engineer several infrastructure configuration pa-
rameters of the IRIDIUM constellation. Second, leveraging the pre-
viously mentioned result, we exploit opportunistic IRIDIUM Ring
Alert (IRA) messages to provide yet another independent localiza-
tion solution. As for the former contribution, one should notice
that, though IRIDIUM Ring Alert are accessible, all other informa-
tion about IRIDIUM are treated as proprietary by the infrastructure
owner: Iridium Communications Inc.. To overcome this lack of
information, we ran an extensive measurement campaign using
commercially available Software Defined Radios (SDRs), acquiring
IRIDIUM Ring Alert messages for more than 1000 hours. Using this
large dataset, we reverse-engineered several network configuration
parameters of the IRIDIUM constellation, including the satellites
speed, packet interarrival times, maximum satellite coverage, satel-
lite pass duration, and the satellite beam constellation—all these
data have been released as open-source [16]. We used the above
parameters to model the IRIDIUM constellation. Later, we moved
to exploit opportunistic IRA messages, combining them with the
information acquired during the reverse-engineering process, to
estimate the current position of the receiving device.
Our research contributes not only to validate the GNSS infor-
mation, but also to provide yet another independent localization
solution—although being slightly inaccurate compared to the GNSS,
given the harsh system conditions—in the presence of GNSS jam-
ming. Being the IRIDIUM constellation characterized by worldwide
availability, our solution can be used even in unattended scenar-
ios (deserts and oceans), where no other ad-hoc in-land network
infrastructure can be used for crowd-sourcing, and where the avail-
able GNSS hardware cannot be replaced or updated with multiple-
antenna setups. Finally, we also highlight some novel, challenging
research directions.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews recent related work on GNSS spoofing detection and
mitigation, Section 3 introduces the main system features of the
IRIDIUM satellite platform, Section 4 depicts the adversarial model
assumed throughout the work, Section 5 illustrates our measure-
ment setup, Section 6 includes the features of the IRIDIUM con-
stellation platform inferred through our measurement campaign,
Section 7 provides the details of our spoofing detection technique
based on opportunistic IRA messages, while Section 8 provides a
systemic comparison between our proposal and the most important
related work. Finally, Section 9 draws conclusions and highlights
our future research directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
GNSS spoofing identification, detection, and mitigation are all re-
search areas that attracted the attention of a lot of researchers
during the years. Major contributions are coming from the idea
of resorting to other over-the-air information to cross-check the
actual position of the targeted spoofed device.
A very recent contribution [17] involves crowd-sourced informa-
tion from cellular network access points to verify the actual position
of the device. Authors showed that beacons broadcast from cellular
networks access points can be exploited to retrieve their position,
and therefore, checking the consistency of the current position of
the device received from the GPS constellation.
Authors in [9] showed that multiple (colluding) GPS receivers
can be used to detect a spoofer. Authors showed that by leveraging
spatial noise correlations, the false acceptance rate of the counter-
measure can be improved while preserving the sensitivity to attacks.
A collaborative detection scheme is proposed in [14]. The authors
assume a set of vehicles exchange measured GPS code pseudo-
ranges using a dedicated short-range communication. Each vehicle
elaborates on the exchanged GPS data and derives independent
statistics. These statistics are then exploited to detect high correla-
tions in the time of arrival of spoofed GPS signals, and therefore,
highlighting the presence of a GPS spoofer.
A physical layer solution is proposed by [29], involving two
antennas with different radiation patterns. Genuine GPS signals are
supposed to come from several sources (satellites), and therefore,
exploiting a two-antenna deployment involves a different signal-
to-noise ratio measured by the two antennas. If the two antennas
experience the same signal-to-noise, it means the signal is coming
from the same source, and therefore, a GPS spoofer is likely to be
in the neighborhood.
Authors in [23] proposed a solution exploiting meteor burst
communications to verify the location of the spoofed device. The
solution exploits the radio reflection properties of ephemeral me-
teor trails, combined with multiple anchors that can be deployed
even hundreds of Km from the receiver. Although being robust
to jamming and eavesdropping, their solution requires dedicated
infrastructure. Another crowd-sourcing solution has been proposed
by [8]. The authors proposed the deployment of multiple nodes
at the ground to monitor the air traffic from GPS-derived position
advertisements that aircraft periodically broadcast for air traffic
control purposes. Spoofing attacks are detected and localized by
the independent infrastructure on the ground which continuously
analyzes the contents and the times of arrival of these advertise-
ments.
GNSS Spoofing Detection via Opportunistic IRIDIUM Signals WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
A vision-based GPS spoofing detection method for unmanned
aerial vehicles (drones) is proposed by [20]. The on-board camera
and the inertial measurement unit are used to get the velocity and
position of the aircraft, thus detecting unexpected changes in the
flight path. Another cooperative solution has been proposed by [6].
The GPS signal is verified by resorting to a network of cooperative
GPS receivers. Each receiver in the network correlates its version of
the signal with those received by other receivers to detect spoofing
attacks. The authors in [12] exploited phase delay measurements
from an antenna array to infer between single and multiple GPS
sources, and therefore, detect the presence of a spoofer.
In Section 8 we will provide a comparison between our solution
and the ones introduced in this section, based on some distinctive
system requirements. We remark that the Iridium satellite network
has been previously exploited for localization purposes by [10]. The
authors exploited physical layer information and a reference anchor
in a well-known position to locate the receiver by resorting to
both time difference of arrival (TDOA) and frequency difference of
arrival (FDOA) techniques. Another similar contribution is provided
by [25] and [26]. The authors exploited the instantaneous Doppler
effect of IRAmessages to infer the position of the receiver. However,
using the Doppler shift for GNSS spoofing detection would require
the deployment of multiple receivers, organized in ad-hoc network
infrastructure, typically not available in deserts and oceans [4],
[21].
Finally, we recall that localization and spoofing detection are
two different research problems, characterized by different system
requirements. Localization techniques are used to either replace
or support the traditional GNSS signals, while spoofing detection
schemes are usually designed to work in conjunctionwith the GNSS,
taking an active part (raising alarms and indicating corrections) only
when they detect inconsistencies between the position reported by
the GNSS and the one obtained via local computations.
3 BACKGROUND ON IRIDIUM
The IRIDIUM satellite platform has been described for the first
time in the seminal paper [11]. The platform has been set up in
1993, and it is mainly constituted by a set of Low-Earth Orbit (LEO)
satellites, able to guarantee the full earth coverage for data and voice
communications. IRIDIUM RF operations take place in the L-band,
i.e., in the range [1, 616 − 1, 626.5]MHz, by resorting to dedicated
satellite-phones, while the communications between the satellites
happen in the 23GHz band. The name of the satellite platform
is due to the initial intended number of satellites, being 77 the
atomic number of the chemical element Iridium. However, the final
deployment of the satellite constellation counts only 66 satellites,
which are the ones necessary to guarantee coverage for the whole
Earth’s surface. On the ground, to initiate and receive IRIDIUM calls,
a user can leverage dedicated satellite phones and pagers provided
by companies such as Motorola and Kyocera. IRIDIUM services are
also used on a subscription basis by aircraft and vessels, thanks to
dedicated transceivers units. Moreover, short IRIDIUM-compliant
transceivers are also available and currently used within Internet
of Things (IoT) products to provide backhaul connections [7].
Each IRIDIUM satellite is characterized by a three-antenna array,
forming a honeycomb pattern of 48 beams on the ground. Therefore,
a generic IRIDIUM user might experience two types of hand-off,
i.e., either from one beam to another beam (intra-satellite) or from
one satellite to another one (inter-satellite). In general, when the
user is served by a beam at the edge of the honeycomb, the system
manages the hand-off to a neighbor satellite.
The channels provided by the system can be divided into two
categories, i.e., system overhead channels and bearer service chan-
nels [18]. In this paper, we are interested in one specific system
overhead channel, i.e., the IRIDIUM Ring Alert (IRA) broadcast
channel. This channel operates at 1, 626.27 MHz, and it is an un-
encrypted downlink-only channel used to send IRA messages to
individual subscriber units—to be used for handover operations.
IRAmessages contain the following plain-text information: satellite
ID, beam ID, location at ground (in terms of longitude and latitude,
as computed by the satellite based on a proprietary algorithm), alti-
tude information (typically around 800 km), and other information
useful for handover purposes, such as the Temporary Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity (TMSI) of the end-user equipment performing the
handover. Note that, being an unencrypted channel, the IRA broad-
cast channel can be received by using a general-purpose Software
Defined Radio (SDR) and a generic antenna.
The position information computed by the IRIDIUM satellites
and emitted through the broadcast IRA channel is used in this
paper to compute a location estimation at the receiver side. This
information is used to cross-check the position estimated from the
GNSS constellation.
4 ADVERSARY AND SYSTEM MODEL
Our adversary model consists of a malicious entity, able to generate
fake GNSS signals by resorting to the combination of an SDR, an
antenna, and a GNSS spoofing software tool, such as [5].
We assume an isolated playground, not relying on any Internet
connection and any other means (e.g., WiFi and Cellular Networks)
to derive location information. A typical scenario that fits the previ-
ous assumptions might be constituted by wide inhabited open areas,
such as deserts, or open seas (oceans), where the target devices can-
not receive any additional information to verify their actual GNSS
location. Figure 1 shows the system model considered throughout
this paper. As a reference scenario, we consider a boat relying on
GNSS information for its navigation. The adversary is willing to
de-tour the boat by performing a GNSS spoofing attack; in particu-
lar, the adversary wants to re-route the boat from path 1 to path
2 in Fig. 1. Our solution exploits the IRIDIUM satellite network to
independently verify the actual position of the boat, and therefore,
raising an alarm when a de-tour is detected.
It is worth noting that we do not assume any active IRIDIUM
subscription. Thus, the IRIDIUM position-providing service Secure
Time and Location (STL) cannot be used. Indeed, purchasing un-
limited subscription plans to IRIDIUM services can be particularly
expensive for shipowners, and it could also require the hiring of
dedicated teams to perform the deployment and maintenance in
all the vessels. On the contrary, our solution exploits opportunistic
IRIDIUM messages; in particular, the IRA messages delivered in
clear-text on the Ring Alert Broadcast Channel (at the frequency
1, 626.27MHz). Indeed, being unencrypted these messages can be
received with a generic low-cost SDR.
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1
2Adversary
Boat
Iridium Satellite Network
Figure 1: Scenario and Adversary model: The target (boat) is
re-routed by the adversary from path 1 to path 2, but our so-
lution enables independent location verification by exploit-
ing the IRIDIUM satellite network. Therefore, eventually
the target will be able to detect the GNSS spoofing attack.
In our system model, as depicted by the gray circle in Fig. 1,
the boat continuously performs a loose localization process, and
therefore, it checks if the current, locally computed, GNSS position
is far away from the position provided by our solution exploiting
the IRIDIUM constellation. In the remainder of this paper, we will
estimate the configuration parameters and evaluate the thresholds
to provide timely, independent, and effective verification of the
GNSS localization.
5 MEASUREMENT SETUP
Figure 2 shows the setup we adopted to receive the messages from
the Iridium constellation. The hardware is mainly constituted by
a Software Defined Radio USRP X310, a telescopic stilo antenna,
and a Laptop Dell XPS15 9560, equipped with 32GB of RAM and
8 Intel Core i7700HQ processors running at 2.80 GHz. As for the
software, we adopted the GNURadio development toolkit and the
related Iridium module [1]. The output is subsequently parsed to
generate meaningful data analytics, available for downloading at
[16].
Our measurement campaign has been carried out in very harsh
conditions: from a balcony outside our office. This sub-optimal
setup significantly affects the number of received packets, being the
antenna very close to the wall of the building. Moreover, the stylo
antenna is recommended for operation from 75MHz to 1GHz, being
therefore not optimal for the reception of the IRIDIUM signals at
1626.270833 MHz. While our setup still guarantees the collection of
a reasonable amount of messages in a long term measurement, due
to a high packet loss, it does not provide the best performance for
a live-test of GPS spoofing detection. In later sections, we provide
more details on statistics related to packet loss and how the later
one affects our solution. The good results achieved in such harsh
conditions undoubtedly show the viability of our approach.
We collected a total of about 1019 hours of measurements con-
sisting of 569, 431 samples. An excerpt from the dataset is reported
in Table 1. For each data sample, we have the time (seconds and
milliseconds), the satellite ID, the beam ID, and both latitude and
longitude of the satellite/beam at the ground. Specifically, when the
Figure 2: Our receiver setup to collect the IRA messages: a
Dell XPS15 9560 laptop and a USRP X310.
Beam ID is equal to zero, the position (latitude/longitude) refers to
the position of the satellite at the ground, e.g., satellite 115 in the
example of Table 1. When the Beam ID is different than zero, lati-
tude and longitude refer to the position of the beam at the ground,
e.g., the second sample is related to beam 44 belonging to satellite
115 having a position at the ground of ⟨+23.06,+49.81⟩. In all our
measurements we counted a total of 66 satellite IDs, i.e., {2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42,
43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 57, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81,
82, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112,
114, 115}, coinciding with the number of active IRIDIUM satellites
reported by the service provider, and the full-beam constellation
equal to 48 beam IDs, i.e., {1, . . . , 48}.
Table 1: Excerpt of the collected dataset.
Time (s) Time (ms) SatelliteID
Beam
ID Latitude Longitude
1580712040 000000739 115 0 +29.81 +046.10
1580712040 000004519 115 44 +23.06 +049.81
1580712040 000005059 115 46 +25.95 +051.69
1580712040 000005599 115 47 +26.94 +047.71
1580712040 000008839 115 0 +30.29 +046.13
1580712040 000013159 115 44 +23.56 +049.80
1580712040 000013699 115 46 +26.46 +051.72
6 IRIDIUM DATA ANALYTICS
In this section, we provide a thorough analysis of the network
information that can be extracted from IRA messages.
Satellites speed. Figure 3 shows the probability distribution
function associated with the satellites speed at the ground. We took
into account all the satellites IDs collected during our measurement
campaign, by considering their positions and the absolute time
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Figure 3: Satellite speed at ground: probability distribution
function associated with satellite speeds at ground andmost
likely speed (6.89Km/s).
associated with the reception of the packets. The satellite speed
v has been computed as the ratio of the difference between two
consecutive positions, i.e., δ , and the elapsed time, i.e., ϵ , yielding
v = δϵ . We observe that the most likely speed is about 6.89 Km/s,
consistent with the approximate speed of a generic LEO satellite [3].
We also notice the presence of many (unlikely) high-speed sam-
ples (v > 10 Km/s). These inconsistent speeds are experienced
when the time difference between two consecutive messages is
particularly high, likely due to the packet loss. In particular, packet
loss, especially when experienced in bursts, accumulates a lot of
errors as for time and space, leading to inconsistent high speeds.
Since we are not aware of the actual accuracy of beam and satellite
coordinates at the ground, we guess that large periods between
packets (due to packet loss) accumulate the aforementioned er-
rors. However, we notice that this phenomenon does not affect the
quality of our solution.
IRAmessage rate. All our analysis is based on the reception of
IRA messages. Figure 4 shows the probability distribution function
associated with the interarrival times of the IRAmessages. The inset
figure shows the relative error to the expected interarrival time of
90 milliseconds, as reported by related work on IRIDIUM [10][25].
Indeed, each beam transmits an IRA message every 4.32 seconds.
Being the number of beams 48, a receiver will receive a generic
IRA message every 90ms ( 4320/48). We observe also that the link
is characterized by an extremely high packet error rate. Indeed,
the likelihood for the interarrival time is about 4.87 seconds, i.e.,
one message is received every 66 lost ones. Conversely, the jitter is
small; indeed, the computational overhead for message decoding
is negligible and the vast majority of the messages experience an
interarrival time that is multiple of 90 ms.
Coverage. To understand the maximum coverage range of an
Iridium-compliant device, we consider the furthest satellite posi-
tions at the ground, independently of the time they have been
collected. Figure 5 shows the furthest satellite positions (at ground)
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Figure 4: IRA interarrival times: probability distribution
function associated to IRA interarrival times and their max-
imum likelihood at 4.87 seconds. The inset figure represents
the relative error respect to 90ms representing the actual
rate at the transmitting side (for different beams).
Figure 5: Maximum satellite distances (at ground) from the
receiving source.
from our locationrepresented by the red cross. Many factors can af-
fect the reception of IRAmessages: mountains in the north-east and
south-west significantly affect the signal propagation, especially
when the satellite is far-away from the receiver, at the minimal
altitude over the horizon, or simply the presence of buildings. The
overall area covered through our setup sums up to about 106·8.3km2,
further demonstrating the capability of a very simple setup to cover
even large areas.
Figure 6 shows the probability density function associated with
the distance between the receiver and the satellite positions at the
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Figure 6: Probability distribution function associated with
themaximum satellite distances (at ground) from the receiv-
ing source. The maximum likelihood is 1, 625 Km.
ground. As previously discussed, the transmission distance is signif-
icantly affected by the geography characterizing the neighborhood
of the receiver. The likelihood of the maximum distance is 1, 625Km.
Note that a similar result can be extracted also by fitting the red
dots in Fig. 6, using the Pratt method [19], obtaining a distance of
about 2, 346 Km.
Satellite pass. Let us consider a specific satellite, i.e., the Iridium
satellite 78. Figure 7 shows all the passes extracted from all the
measurements we collected about the aforementioned satellite. We
adopted the red and green colors for the upward and downward
directions, respectively. The overall coverage is consistent with the
data we previously discussed for Fig. 5, while we observe a total of
59 passes upward and 59 downward in a period of time of about
1000 hours.
The pass duration can be computed by considering the time
between the instant when the satellite appears at the receiver and
the last sample before disappearing. Figure 8 shows the probability
distribution function associated with the pass duration, considering
all the satellites data collected from all our measurements. The max-
imum likelihood for the pass is about 7.59minutes. The distribution
presents a heavy tail on the left side, i.e., pass duration less than 4
minutes: this is due to satellites crossing the coverage region far
away from the receiver, and therefore, being characterized by short
periods of intersection with the coverage area of the receiver. We
searched for the best fit distribution and we found that to be the
Extreme Value Distribution evd(t), as depicted by Eq. 1.
evd(t) = 1
σ
exp
(
t − µ
σ
)
exp
(
− exp
(
t − µ
σ
))
, (1)
where µ = 7.28 and σ = 1.67 are the best-fit location parameter
and the scale parameter of the distribution, respectively.
Satellite and beams. Figure 9 shows an example pass (red cir-
cles) of satellite 78 and the beams (red dots) with the related beam
IDs. We recall that both the beam positions at the ground and the
Figure 7: Satellite 78 passes: data collected from Iridium
satellite 78, where red and green dots represent upward and
downward passes, respectively.
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Figure 8: Pass duration: probability distribution function as-
sociated with the duration of a satellite pass.
beam IDs have been collected from the IRA messages. Due to the
previously mentioned packet loss rate, many beams are missing
and only a subset of them are available at the receiver. In the afore-
mentioned case study, we were able to retrieve 89 beam positions
belonging to 15 different beams (for one satellite pass).
Beam constellation. We consider all the satellite beams col-
lected from all our measurements and we computed their displace-
ment to the satellite position. Black dots in Fig. 10 show the beam
constellation, while red crosses represent the centroid for each cloud
of beams. The labels are consistent with the beam IDs retrieved
from the IRA messages. The beam constellation is constituted by
48 beams organized in three concentric circles with radii of about
3.36, 7.98, and 14.35 Km, respectively.
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Figure 9: Single satellite pass and beams: red circles repre-
sent the position of satellite 78 (at ground) while red dots
show the beams’ position at the ground. Beams IDs are re-
ported accordingly to the information collected from the
IRA message.
Finally, we observe that, to represent the beams in awell-organized
constellation, we had to detect, distinguish, and subsequently com-
pensate, satellites moving north (upward) from the ones moving
south (downward). Indeed, as previously discussed, data collected
from beams might seem inconsistent, but actually, it is not, when
making the following considerations:
• Same beams belonging to the same satellite moving on different
directions. The same satellite can be observed going north,
and subsequently south, after approximately 650 minutes.
Indeed, due to its inclined orbit, the satellite will be back to
the original position with the opposite transit direction.
• Same beams belonging to different satellites moving on differ-
ent directions. Each location experiences different satellites
going to different directions, either north or south.
For both the above configurations, the beam IDs should be mir-
rored to the x-axis. In particular, the beam constellation reported
in Fig. 10 is consistent with satellites going upward, i.e., from the
south pole to the north pole.
7 GPS SPOOFING DETECTION
In this section, we provide the details of our GNSS spoofing detec-
tion technique, aimed at detecting GNSS spoofing attacks using the
IRIDIUM satellite constellation. Section 7.1 introduces the error in
the position estimation via the IRA messages, Section 7.2 presents
the details of our spoofing detection solution, Section 7.3 shows the
performance of the described technique, while Section 7.4 discusses
the feasibility of a combined spoofing attack involving both the
GNSS system and the IRIDIUM constellation.
Figure 10: Relative beam positions (at ground) respect to the
satellite position (at ground). Each black dot represents a dif-
ferent measurement while crosses represent the centroid of
each cloud associated to a different beam. Labels are consis-
tent with the beam identifiers retrieved from the IRA mes-
sages.
7.1 Position error estimation
In this subsection, we estimate the error between the actual receiver
position (taken from the GPS) and the one computed from the
information extracted from the IRA messages. The intuition behind
our solution consists of computing the mean of all the latitude
and longitude coordinates (centroid) collected from the beams. In
general, the precision of the position estimation will be affected
by the number of collected IRA messages, and therefore, the time
required to receive such a number of messages (waiting time).
Figure 11 shows the error between the receiver position and the
estimated location, as a function of the number of collected IRA
messages. We observe that an error of about 10Km can be reached
by collecting about 6,100 IRA messages.
Interestingly, the relationship between the localization error Lerr
and the number of IRA messages n is characterized by a power-law,
as depicted by the red line in Fig. 11, that in turn, is represented by
Eq. 2:
Lerr = n
m · 10q , (2)
wherem = −0.5974 and q = 3.2826.
Figure 12 shows the relation between the number of IRA mes-
sages and the time to collect them, given different packet error
rates, i.e., {0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 0.99}. In our scenario, given the adopted
equipment and setup, we experienced a very high packet error rate
(CFR. Fig. 4), summing up to about 1 message received every 66, i.e.,
a packet error just slightly less than 0.99. In better conditions, lower
packet error rates can be easily achieved, leading to a significantly
higher amount of collected packets per unit of time. As depicted in
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Figure 11: Localization error as a function of the number of
received IRA messages.
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Figure 12: Waiting Time (delay) to collect the IRA messages
as a function of the packet error rate.
Fig. 12, in the worst-case scenario—our deployment, 6100 packets,
guaranteeing a localization error of about 10Km, require about 10
hours. Assuming lower packet error rates and good receiving con-
ditions (such as in a desert or ocean), the same amount of packets
can be collected in 1 hour or even in 6 minutes, assuming a packet
error rate of either 10% or 1%, respectively.
7.2 Exploiting IRA messages to estimate
receiver location
Our solution involves a multi-stage algorithm described in the
following.
(1) Collect data. The user continuously collects IRA messages
from the IRIDIUM constellation network, as described in the
previous sections.
(2) Compensate movement. Given the movement of the re-
ceiver during themessage collection, the acquired data should
be compensated as a function of the movement. Therefore,
assuming the acquisition process starts at t0, and the user
is moving with speed v , the collected information from the
IRA messages should be compensated as reported by Eq. 3.
∆x = x(t0) + cos(v · ∆t),
∆y = y(t0) + sin(v · ∆t), (3)
where∆t is the time between two consecutive IRIDIUM pack-
ets, while x and y are latitude and longitude, respectively.
(3) Compute location Ipos . The position of the receiver is es-
timated as the centroid computed over the beams’ positions
at ground, yielding Eq. 4.
Ipos =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi ,
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi
)
, (4)
where (xi ,yi ) are the latitude and longitude of the position
at ground for beam i , while N is the number of beams taken
into account for the computation (cfr. Fig. 11).
(4) Compare Ipos withGpos . The estimated position Ipos from
the IRIDIUM satellite network is compared with that one
received from the GNSS systemGpos . Depending on different
parameters, that will be discussed later on, an alarm is raised
if the difference is greater than a predetermined threshold
thr , i.e., | Ipos −Gpos |> thr .
7.3 Performance
Our solution is particularly suitable for scenarios where crowd-
sourcing is not possible, i.e., there are no other independent sources
in the neighborhood to verify the current GNSS localization. A few
examples of such scenarios are deserts, forests, remote rural areas,
and open seas. We choose the latter one as our reference scenario,
and without loss of generality, we consider a ship moving through
a pre-defined path according to different speeds. According to the
specific cruise speed, we provide different indicators to measure
the performance of our solution.
In the following, we consider different classes of ships [13], as
depicted in Table 2. Class S1, i.e., bulk carriers, carry unpacked
bulk cargo, class S2, i.e., Container Ships, carry containers, S3, i.e.,
Oil and chemical tankers, are designed specifically to carry oil and
chemicals, S4, i.e., RORO vessels, roll on roll off ships are special
types of vessels used for the transportation of automobile vehicles,
and finally, S5, i.e., Cruise Ships, are luxury vessels used to take
passengers on pleasure journey.
As previously discussed, the accuracy of the estimated location
Ipos depends on the number of collected messages. Indeed, recalling
Fig. 12, the number of collected messages is correlated to the time
dedicated to collect them. Considering a location estimation error of
about 10 Km, meaning 6, 100 IRA messages to be collected in about
6 minutes (packet loss equal to 1%), the fastest ship, i.e., S5, would
have moved off about 4.1Km (worst case). In the best-case scenario,
the slowest ship, i.e., either S1 or S3, would have traveled less than
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Table 2: Ship type and speeds.
Ship Type Speed[knots]
Speed
[km/h]
S1 Bulk Carriers 13-15 24-28
S2 Container Ships 16-24 30-44
S3 Oil and chemical tankers 13-17 24-31
S4 RORO vessels 16-22 30-41
S5 Cruise Ships 20-25 37-46
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Figure 13: False positive events as a function of the number
of collected IRA messages.
3.1 Km in the same amount of time (6 minutes). This means that,
for all the considered cases, the movement performed by the ship
is in the same order of the localization error, and therefore, our
solution can be effectively adopted to detect GPS spoofing attacks.
Definition 7.1. Given a threshold thr , we define a False Positive
event when no GNSS spoofing attack is present, and a position Ipos
computed exploiting the IRA messages verifies |Ipos −Gpos | > thr
—whereGpos is the position computed from the GNSS constellation.
Figure 13 shows the false positive rate as a function of the col-
lected IRA messages, considering three different thresholds, i.e.,
thr ∈ {10, 15, 20} Km, for a number of IRA messages varying from
10 to 10,000. We want to stress that we are considering single false-
positive events, while a more in-depth analysis considering the
temporal distribution of false-positive events (bursts of consecutive
events) might significantly improve the robustness of our solution
to false alarms—this task is left for future work.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that there is a relationship
between the false positive rate and the number of IRA messages
considered in the location estimation technique. Indeed, we fit
the samples belonging to the three different thresholds by using a
linear regression model, yielding the solid lines in Fig. 13, i.e., the
red solid line for thr = 10 Km, the green solid line for thr = 15
Km, and finally, the blue solid line for thr = 20km. The best-fit
model associated with the aforementioned samples is represented
by Eq. 5:
y = 10m ·n · 10q , (5)
where n is the number of IRA messages, q ≈ 0, andm = −4.6 · 10−5,
m = −8.9·10−5,m = −1.4·10−4 for thr = 10, thr = 15, and thr = 20,
respectively.
Overall, Eq. 2 and Eq. 5 allow an end-user deploying our solution
to have an immediate idea of the expected system performance. In
particular, knowing the number of messages received in a given unit
of time, the cited equations can be used to provide an estimation
of the expected location accuracy and false-positives rate of the
system—this latter one with the caveat that just a single value
exceeding the threshold would trigger the alarm.
7.4 Spoofing the IRIDIUM satellite
constellation
With our solution in place, the only chance for the adversary to
fool the receiver would be to perform a combined attack on both
the GNSS and IRIDIUM platforms. In the following, we discuss the
feasibility of spoofing IRIDIUM signals. As detailed in the following,
it runs out that, given the nature of our solution, spoofing IRID-
IUM signals to subvert our localization system is more challenging
compared to all the GNSS ones.
Time. Our solution requires a not-negligible amount of time
(depending on the packet loss) to locate the vessel with a small
precision error (less than 10Km). While GNSS requires seconds to
be spoofed, to affect our IRIDIUM-based localization system, the
adversary has to deploy a transmitter that should keep transmitting
for either minutes or hours, thus becoming easier to detect, identify,
and locate.
Signal strength. The IRIDIUM satellite infrastructure is sig-
nificantly different from the typical GNSS constellations. GNSS
satellites are far away from the ground (in a MEO orbit, at about
20, 000 Km), while the Iridium constellation is composed of LEO
satellites, orbiting at about 800 Km. Therefore, the received signal
strength on the ground is higher than the GNSS ones [26], and hence
the adversary requires higher transmission power to overcome the
legitimate signal.
Complexity. The adversary should mimic a consistent array
of beams moving coherently all together, at a consistent speed,
with consistent interarrival times, and eventually, with compatible
passes duration. We consider this event very unlikely, especially
considering the time factor previously described.
8 SYSTEM-LEVEL COMPARISONWITH
OTHER SOLUTIONS
To provide further insights, Table 3 wraps up an overview of the
system requirements for both the works previously discussed in
Section 2 and our proposal. We notice that most of the already pro-
posed solutions rely on auxiliary network infrastructures. These
auxiliary infrastructures can be set up ad-hoc for the spoofing detec-
tion task (such as in [23], [8] and [6]), or they can be already in place
for other purposes (e.g., the mobile cellular network used in [17]
and the avionics network in [8]). However, these infrastructures are
generally not available in remote or offshore areas, such as deserts
and open seas. Other proposals, such as [9], [14], [29], and [6], rely
on multi-antenna detection schemes, requiring a dedicated setup
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Table 3: Overview of related work on GNSS spoofing detection and related system requirements.
Ref. No need for
Auxiliary
Ad-Hoc
Infrastructure
No need for
Auxiliary
In-land
Infrastructure
No need for
PHY-layer
Information
No need for
Dedicated
Hardware
No need for
Multiple
Antennas
[17] ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
[9] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
[14] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
[29] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
[23] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
[8] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
[20] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
[6] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
[12] ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Our Proposal ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
and the hard swap of existing GNSS receivers. Moreover, schemes
such as [12] require access to physical layer information of the
GNSS signal, and therefore, requiring dedicated equipment to be
deployed, they come with consequently high costs.
Overall, the comparison shows that our proposal leveraging op-
portunistic IRIDIUM signals is the only one that does not require
any auxiliary ad-hoc infrastructure, it does not leverage any physi-
cal layer information and, finally, it does not require the deployment
of either multiple antennas or dedicated hardware. Therefore, our
solution is ideal when a specific target receiver is meant to be op-
erated in remote areas (desert or open seas), and whose hardware
cannot be modified after deployment.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have provided two major contributions: we have
reverse-engineered several system features of the IRIDIUM satellite
constellation, and we have proposed a new solution to detect GNSS
spoofing attacks— combining the cited features with the publicly
available IRIDIUM Ring Alert messages. We have provided an ef-
ficient and effective location verification algorithm, independent
fromGNSS technology, that can be used to verify the actual position
computed from standard GNSS technologies. Overall, our solution
is worldwide-available, cheap, non-invasive, and it does not require
either information from the radio physical-layer or multiple anten-
nas. Therefore, it is particularly suitable for unattended scenarios,
where there are no other entities that can help to verify the actual
position of the receiver. These scenarios include deserts, poles, and
open seas, to name a few. The data have been obtained thanks to an
extensive measurement campaign lasting over 1000 hours, and they
have been also made public to foster research in this challenging
field.
Our future work will focus on the characterization of the power-
law obeying phenomena highlighted by our experimental campaign,
to improve the accuracy of the location verification scheme, as
well as to analyze the time-correlation among false-positive events
to declare a GNSS spoofing attack. We will also collect further
measurements data, using newly acquired dedicated equipment,
such as powerful IRIDIUM-compliant L-band antennas.
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